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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CAN SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION AS
AN ASPECT OF DIVERSITY QUALIFY AS AN IMPORTANT
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY STANDARD?
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)
Conna Bond"
The United States sued Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and the
State of Virginia (collectively Virginia) in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia, claiming that Virginia
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
excluding female students from VMI.2 Applying the intermediate

* This effort is dedicated to those who most inspire me: Mark, Emily Beth and Chelsea
Bond, Dewane and Emily Brueske, and Vicki A. Ballou, Esq.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part, "No
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
2. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993). The suit originated from a complaint
filed by the United States Department of Justice on behalf of a female student who wanted to
attend the institute. Id.
The issues in this suit were not new to Virginia. More than 25 years earlier, four female
plaintiffs sued to compel their admission to the University of Virginia at Charlottesville. Kirstein
v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184, 185 (E.D. Va. 1970). At the time the suit was filed, the university
was the largest and most prestigious school of higher learning in Virginia. Id. at 186. No similar
opportunities were available to the plaintiffs in that state. Id. The Kirstein court held that the
university violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying the plaintiffs "their constitutional
right to an education equal with that offered men at Charlottesville." Id. at 187. The court
declined to hold that Virginia could not operate any single-sex school, but expressly reserved
its holding for the facts of that case. Id
When Kirstein was decided, courts applied the rational basis standard of review to genderbased classifications because the intermediate scrutiny standard of review was not formulated
until Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), six years later. See infra note 3. However, the
Kirstein court reached its decision without employing the traditional analysis because the
Kirstein defendants did not assert a purpose in defense of the classification. See Kirstein, 309
F. Supp. at 187 (observing that the plaintiffs did not object to the merits or speed of the
defendant's plan to admit women to the university, but rather objected that there was no
assurance that the plan would be permanently effectuated). The Kirstein defendants were, in fact,
open to the relatively new idea of eradicating gender discrimination from the realm of
educational opportunity. Id. at 186.
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scrutiny standard of review,' the district court found that Virginia's
asserted objective of diversity in education served an important
governmental interest.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit disagreed.' On remand, Virginia proposed to establish a
parallel program for women at an existing all-female college.6 Upon

3. United States v. Virginia, 766 F Supp. at 1410 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). The intermediate scrutiny standard first emerged in Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in the context of an equal protection challenge to a state liquor
statute. See id at 191-92, 197. The Craig majority stated that "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id at 197.
Although the Craig majority opinion did not expressly recognize a new, "intermediate'
standard of review, Justice Stevens and then Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the creation of a
new standard in their separate opinions. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority but
contended that only one standard of review was necessary. Id at 211-12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In fact, he argued that the existing two-tiered method of analyzing equal protection
claims was really a single standard with outcomes dictated by reasons not properly described
in "all encompassing terms." Id at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
The clearest recognition and strongest criticism of the newly formed standard of review
appeared in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. Id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the majority enunciated the standard without citing to any
prior authority, and that such language was absent both from prior case law and the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He opined that the Court already had
enough difficulty with the existing standards so that a new, middle standard seemed ill-advised.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He expressed concern over the ability of the Court to make
unprejudiced judgments about whether objectives are important enough and relationships are
substantial enough. Id at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also considered the rational basis
standard sufficient for appraising equal protection inquiries such as the one in Craig.Id at 222
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The real question in such inquiries, Justice Rehnquist intimated, was
whether the incidence of a designated trait was greater among one class than another so as to
justify differential treatment. Id. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He asserted that, absent an
important personal interest protected by the Constitution or a history of discrimination against
the burdened class, no elevated level of scrutiny was warranted. Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
4. United States v. Virginia, 766 R Supp. at 1413. For a discussion of the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review, see supra note 3.
5. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992) (vacating the judgment
of the district court and remanding the case for the formulation and implementation of a plan
conforming to the equal protection principles discussed in the opinion because Virginia failed
to articulate an important objective to support the maintenance of VMI's single-sex status), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 946 (1993). The instant Court subsequently affirmed this decision of the Fourth
Circuit. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276-82 (1996).
6. United States v. Virginia, 852 F Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 52 F3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The
proposed plan, called Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), was especially tailored
to the needs of college-age women and was set in the all-female environment of Mary Baldwin
College. Id.
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approval of the plan by both the district court7 and the Fourth Circuit,'
the United States petitioned for and was granted certiorari.9
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis with an inquiry
into the actual purpose underlying Virginia's exclusion of female
students from the institute. 0 Virginia asserted that its objective was to
promote diversity in education by maintaining a single-sex educational
opportunity"' within a primarily coeducational system.12 The Court
rejected this contention and concluded that Virginia's asserted objective
was not its genuine objective. 3 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
initial judgment, reversed its final judgment, and HELD, that Virginia
violated the Equal Protection Clause by excluding female students from
the institute and that the remedial plan failed to cure the violation. 4
More than two decades before deciding the instant case, the Court
declared its prerogative to inquire whether the asserted purpose is the
actual purpose of a challenged statutory scheme in an equal protection
case. 5 The Court performs an actual purpose inquiry when it has cause
to question whether a statutory objective has been contrived solely to
satisfy the applicable standard of review. 6 Intermediate scrutiny is the
standard of review applied when a gender-based classification is

7. Id. at 484 ("If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then [the parallel program for
women] marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both will have arrived at
the same destination. The defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan will be approved.").
8. United States v. Virginia, 44 E3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming the district
court's approval of the proposal after applying a "heightened intermediate scrutiny test" tailored
to the particular circumstances of the case and imposing specific criteria on the implementation
of the proposal), reh'g denied, 52 F3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'a 116 S. CL 2264 (1996).
9. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
10. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-79.
11. Id. at 2276.
12. Id. at 2289 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13: Id. at 2277, 2279 (finding no close resemblance between Virginia's alleged objective
and the actual underlying purpose and no persuasive evidence that the institute's all-male
admission policy furthered a state policy of diversity).
14. Id. at 2276.
15. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1974) (stating that "the mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against
any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme"). The WeinbergerCourt also
recognized that a court need not accept an asserted legislative objective where examination of
the legislative scheme and its history reveals the objective to be otherwise. See id. at 648 n.16
(citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1973), United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 428 (1972)).
16. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277 ("In cases of this genre, our
precedent instructs that 'benign' justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will
not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not
rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded."); see also supra note 15.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

3

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
LAW REVIEW
FLORIDA

[Vol. 48

challenged.17 In order to satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard,
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 8
If the Court chooses to perform an actual purpose inquiry in a gender
classification case, that inquiry relates to the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard, which requires the Court to determine whether
the challenged classification serves a legitimate and important governmental objective.19
The inception of the actual purpose inquiry pre-dated the intermediate scrutiny standard. Two years before the formulation of that standard,
the Court inquired into the actual purpose underlying a provision of the
Social Security Act in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.20 Under the challenged provision, Social Security benefits based on the earnings of
deceased male workers were payable to their wives, children, and
surviving dependent parents.2 However, benefits based on the earnings
of female workers were only payable to their children in limited
circumstances and were not payable to their husbands or widowers.'
The Weinbergerappellant claimed that the purpose of the discriminatory classification was to compensate women in the work force for the
economic disadvantages that confronted them.' The Court rejected the
purpose advanced by the appellant and instead relied on legislative
history to determine the actual objective. The Court found evidence
of legislative intent to enable widows with dependent children to choose
to give full-time care to their children rather than work outside the
home. The Court determined that the purpose of the classification was
17. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also supra note 3.
18. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
19. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (indicating
that the first step under the standard involves inquiry into both the legitimacy and the importance
of the asserted statutory objective). One year prior to Hogan, the Court noted that "the search
for the 'actual' or 'primary' purpose of a statute is likely to be elusive." Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1981) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) and McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973)). The second prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard involves determining whether
the challenged classification is substantially related to the achievement of the objective. Hogan,
458 U.S. at 725; see also supra note 3.
20. 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) (considering whether a provision of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g), violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The
intermediate scrutiny standard first appeared in 1976. See Craig,429 U.S. at 217-18 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see also supra note 3.
21. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 643.

22. Id. at 643-44.
23. Id. at 648.
24. Il at 648-51.
25. See id. at 649 (citing ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, FINAL REPORT 31
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not premised on particular disadvantages confronting women because no
similar provision was made for either young widows without children
or widows with grown children.26 Rather, the real purpose was to
provide children who were deprived of one parent with the opportunity
for personal attention from the remaining parent.27 In light of that
purpose, the Court considered it irrational to categorically deny
widowers the choice to give full-time care to their dependent children
while allowing widows to make that choice.28 Concluding that the
challenged classification essentially discriminated among surviving
children based solely on the gender of the surviving parent,2 9 the Court
held it invalid.30
Weinberger was eventually categorized as one of a series of rejected
attempts to characterize gender-based classifications as compensatory,
where statutory language and legislative history revealed otherwise.31
The actual purpose inquiry was often part of the Court's response to this
emerging pattern of questionable compensatory justifications.32 However, the Court's inquiry into the actual purpose of a challenged gender
classification did not always reveal an impermissible purpose.
For instance, in Califano v. Webster,33 the Court considered a
challenge to another provision of the Social Security Act.34 The
challenged provision contained a formula for computing old-age
insurance benefits that favored retired female wage earners over retired
male wage earners. 35 Examination of the legislative history revealed an
express intent to compensate for past employment discrimination against
women.36 Furthermore, the Court found that, since the benefits were

(1938)).
26. See id. at 648, 650.

27. Id. at 648-49.
28. Id. at 651.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 653.
31. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728-29 (finding that the challenged classification tended
to perpetuate a stereotype rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by women);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 213 (1977) (finding that dependency, not need, was the
facial criterion for awarding statutory benefits). But see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318
(1977) (per curiam) (finding that the challenged statute directly compensated women for past
economic discrimination).
32. See, e.g., Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728-29; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 213.

33. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 314, 316 (scrutinizing § 215 of the Social Security Act, as added, 64 Stat. 506,
and amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1970 & Supp. V) under the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
35. See id. at 314-16.
36. Id. at 318.
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computed on the basis of past earnings, the statute genuinely compensated women for past economic discrimination.37 The Webster Court
upheld the classification because its only appreciable purpose "was the
permissible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate
treatment of women."38
Five years after Webster, the Court undertook a similar actual
purpose inquiry in the context of public education. 39 In Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,4° a male student instigated an equal
protection challenge to an admissions policy that excluded males from
enrolling for credit in a state-supported nursing school.41 The State
asserted the familiar objective of compensation for past discrimination
against women. 42
Finding that women predominated in nursing and did not lack
educational or leadership opportunities in that field,43 the Hogan Court
determined that the exclusion of males from the nursing school did not
compensate for discrimination against females but actually perpetuated
a gender stereotype." The Court noted that the State failed to establish
legislative intent regarding the policy's compensatory purpose.45
Furthermore, a substantial relationship between the classification and the
objective was not credible since men were allowed to attend classes as
auditors, and there was no evidence that their presence obstructed the
achievement of the school's educational goals. 46 The Hogan Court
47
concluded that the alleged compensatory purpose was not genuine,
and it ultimately held that the university's exclusion of males violated
the Equal Protection Clause.48
In contrast with Weinberger, Webster, and Hogan, the instant case
did not involve a dispute over an alleged compensatory purpose.4 9

37. See id.
38. Id. at 317 (quoting Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 209 n.8).
39. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-30 (1982).
40. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
41. Id. at 719-21.
42. See id. at 727.
43. Id. at 729.
44. Id. at 729-30.
45. Id. at 730 n.16 (comparing Webster, 430 U.S. at 318, in which legislative history
revealed a purposeful enactment of more favorable treatment of retired female wage earners and
a clear compensatory objective).
46. Id. at 730.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 733.
49. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 (observing that Virginia asserted
educational benefits, including diversity in education and avoiding the negative effect of
admitting women on VMI's unique educational method, as its purpose for maintaining VMI as
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Rather, Virginia asserted as its objective the preservation of state-wide
diversity in education." Citing the Hogan court's actual purpose
analysis with approval,5 the instant Court began its analysis with an
inquiry into the actual purpose behind Virginia's exclusion of female
students from VMI.52 The Court initially focused on the historical
deficiencies in Virginia's "alleged pursuit of diversity through single-sex
educational options."53 The Court pointed out that the admission of
women to the University of Virginia more than two decades earlier was
the culmination of an extended, bitter struggle.54 Furthermore, at the
time that VMI was established, some thought that higher education was
dangerous for women 5 and that the admission of women to all-male
schools would result in lowered educational standards and encroachment
on the rights of men. 6
In further analysis, the instant Court called into question the current
lack of public single-sex higher educational opportunities for women in
Virginia. 7 The Court additionally noted that there was only one
legislative statement of record in which Virginia expressed itself in
regard to gender distinctions in education. 8 Finally, the Court did not
consider Virginia's earlier reexamination and reaffirmance of VMI's allmale admissions policy in response to Hogan to be sufficient evidence
of a state policy to evenhandedly advance diversity in education. 9 The
instant Court ultimately found that Virginia's alleged objective of
diversity was not genuine.'
Although the instant Court's actual purpose inquiry ostensibly falls
neatly into the series of actual purpose inquiries undertaken in
Weinberger, Webster, and Hogan, the inquiry in the instant case actually
is somewhat atypical. The instant Court's inquiry is distinctive because

a single-sex educational institution).
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Hogan, 102 S. CL at 3337-39).
52. Id. at 2276-79.
53. Id. at 2277.
54. Id. (citing 2 T. WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION INTHE UNITED STATES
254 (1929)).
55. See id. at 2277 n.9.
56. Id. at 2278 (citing 2 T. WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION INTHE UNITED
STATES 255 (1929)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 898-99 (citing VIRGINIA COMM'N ON
THE UNIV. OF THE 21T CENTURY, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA (1990))).

59. Id. at 2278-79.
60. Id. at 2277 (concluding that there was no close resemblance between the alleged
objective and the actual purpose of the classification).
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it focuses on an asserted purpose of diversity in education 6 rather than
the compensatory purpose asserted in the cases the Court purported to
follow.62 In that sense, Hogan was not as closely on point as the instant
Court's opinion seems to indicate. 3 Despite the instant Court's focus
on the genuineness of Virginia's asserted purpose of diversity, the
instant Court did not directly address whether public, single-sex
education as an aspect of diversity might qualify as an important
governmental interest in satisfaction of the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard.' The Court's apparent evasion of that issue is
significant because the instant case presented the Court with a conspicuous opportunity to make a finding on that issue, regardless of whether
the challenged VMI classification ultimately would have passed
constitutional muster.65
The instant Court started its actual purpose inquiry by recognizing
the pedagogical benefits that single-sex education affords to some
students. 6 The Court specifically stated that it did not dispute the value
of diversity in public education.67 However, in keeping its observations
as to the positive aspects of single-sex education separate from its
commentary on the value of educational diversity, the Court avoided any
insinuation that single-sex education as an aspect of educational
diversity may qualify as an important governmental interest under the
intermediate scrutiny standard. 8
Not surprisingly, the instant Court directly attacked Virginia's alleged
objective without indicating what result might have occurred had the
Court found that Virginia's asserted objective was genuine.69 However,
based on the Court's subsequent analysis, it can be inferred that such a

61. See id. at 2276, 2289.
62. See supra notes 20-30, 33-38 & 40-48 and accompanying text.
63. But see United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277 (stating that "Mississippi Univ.
for Women is immediately on point").
64. See id. at 2276-82. The Court did make it clear that States are free to "evenhandedly"
support diverse educational opportunities. Id. at 2276 n.7. However, the instant case does little
to illuminate the Court's definition of evenhanded support of diverse educational opportunities,
other than to show that the reservation of a unique and advantageous educational opportunity
only for males does not fall within that definition. See id. at 2279.
65. See id. at 2276 (noting that Virginia contended that single-sex education provides
important educational benefits and contributes to educational diversity).
66. Id. at 2276-77.
67. Id. at 2277.
68. See id. The Court's recognition that Virginia allegedly pursued diversity through
single-sex educational options was not the same as recognition that such a pursuit, if genuine,
would serve an important governmental interest.
69. See id. at 2277 ("Neither recent nor distant history bears out Virginia's alleged pursuit
of diversity through single-sex educational options.").
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finding would not have changed the instant Court's final holding. The
Court reasoned that a purpose of genuine educational diversity was not
served by a plan that afforded a unique educational opportunity only to
males.7" The Court also found that VMI's mission of producing
"citizen-soldiers" was not substantially advanced by categorically
excluding women." Finally, the Court found that Virginia's proposed
parallel plan for women did not qualify as the institute's equal in a
number of significant respects.72
These findings sufficiently support the Court's final holding without
regard to the outcome of the Court's actual purpose inquiry. The Court
essentially found that the exclusive reservation of VMI's unique
educational benefits for males was not substantially related to the
asserted purpose of educational diversity.73 As such, the Court might
reasonably have concluded that Virginia failed to satisfy the second,
substantial relationship prong of the intermediate scrutiny standard. That
the outcome of the instant Court's actual purpose inquiry was incidental
to its final holding is some evidence that the Court acted deliberately to
sidestep the issue concerning single-sex education as an aspect of
diversity.
Although inconclusive, there is further evidence that the Court acted
deliberately to avoid that issue. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
disclosed a number of sources noted in the record indicating that
Virginia historically adhered to a policy of promoting diversity in
education.74 Nevertheless, the Court relied on the Fourth Circuit's
70. Il at 2279 (citing United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899). The Court's focus on
the uniqueness of the institute's program may distinguish the instant case from cases in which
the challenging parties have access to similar educational opportunities elsewhere. That focus
also contributed to the Court's ability to avoid deciding generally whether single-sex education
may qualify as an important governmental interest in satisfaction of the intermediate scrutiny
standard. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
71. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2281-82.
72. Id. at 2284-85 (finding that the parallel program differed in its level of military
training; that it differed in the composition of its student body,; faculty, course offerings and
facilities; and that its graduates could not anticipate the same benefits, advantage of prestige, and
access to the influential alumni network that characterized the institute).
73. Id. at 2279 ("A purpose genuinely to advance an array of education options.. . is not
served by... a plan to 'affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males.' ") (quoting United
States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
74. Id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the parties stipulated that the 1990
Report of the Virginia Commission on the University of the 21st Century to the Governor and
General Assembly of Virginia indicated that the "hallmarks of Virginia's educational policy are
'diversity and autonomy' "). Justice Scalia also pointed out that there were references to
Virginia's heritage of diversity in higher education in the 1969 Report of the Virginia
Commission on Constitutional Revision, the 1989 Virginia Plan for Higher Education, the 1974
Report of the General Assembly Commission on Higher Education to the General Assembly of
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observation that there was only one statement of record in which
Virginia expressed itself regarding both gender distinctions and diversity
in higher education.75 The instant Court's selective reliance on the
Fourth Circuit's opinion is another indication that the Court made a
deliberate choice between two options. The Court could have found
either that Virginia's alleged objective was its actual objective, which
would have required the Court to squarely face the issue of the validity
of single-sex education as an aspect of diversity," or, inthe tradition
of Hogan," it could have found that Virginia's alleged objective was
not its actual objective and avoid setting a precedent as to that issue.
The Court apparently chose the latter course.78
It is evident from the instant case that the actual purpose inquiry is
a powerful tool the Court may employ when it wishes to avoid setting
certain precedents. It appears that the instant Court's actual purpose
inquiry, in conjunction with the Court's focus on the uniqueness of the
VMI program,79 permitted the Court to reach a decision having less
precedential value than it might have had otherwise. Taken at face
value, this case leaves undecided the question of whether single-sex
education as an aspect of public educational diversity may qualify as an
important governmental interest. ° If one believes Justice Scalia,
however, the instant case is the final nail in the coffin of public singlesex education." Although the accuracy of Justice Scalia's position on
this issue is debatable, it is reasonable to predict that the instant case
will be used as authority to argue that single-sex education as an aspect
of educational diversity cannot satisfy the governmental interest prong
of the intermediate scrutiny standard.

Virginia, and the Budget Initiatives for 1990-1992 of the State Council of Higher Education for
Virginia. Id. at 2299 n.2.
75. Id. at 2278; see also id at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-79. Since Virginia alleged its
objective specifically, it is hard to conceive of any other way the Court might have avoided this
issue.
77. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.

78. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. at 2277.
79. See id at 2276 n.7 ("We address specifically and only an educational opportunity
recognized by the District Court and the Court of Appeals as 'unique.' ")
80. But see id. (stating that the Court did not question the State's prerogative to
evenhandedly support diverse educational opportunities); id. at 2279 (implying that evenhanded
administration of diverse educational options in regard to gender would qualify them as
legitimate state interests).
81. Id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('Today... change is forced upon Virginia, and
reversion to single-sex education is prohibited nationwide, not by democratic processes but by
order of this Court.").
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THE EXTENT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE IN FLORIDA
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren,
678 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1996)
Josias N. Dewey*
Respondent's wife, while a passenger in the driver's father's car, was
killed in a single-car accident.' The driver was insured by the Petitioners, the driver's father's insurance companies The policy issued by the
Petitioners provided $50,000 in liability coverage and an additional
$50,000 in uninsured motorist (UM) insurance.3 As a passenger riding
with the primary insured, the Respondent's wife was protected under the

policy's liability and UM coverage.4 However, the policy contained a
clause, known as a "your car" exclusion, which stated that the primary
insured's car was not an uninsured vehicle. Thus, the terms of the policy
denied the passenger UM benefits.5 Following the accident, the
Respondent partially settled with the Petitioners for the full amount of
liability coverage available.6 Subsequently, the respondent filed suit to
recover the $50,000 in UM coverage under the policy.' The trial court
granted summary judgment for the Petitioners The First District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that Florida Statutes section
627.727(3)(b) (1989) barred Petitioners from excluding recovery from
the Respondent.' Certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court of
* Dedicated to my parents, Joe and Sharon Dewey.
1. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren, 678 So. 2d 324, 325-26 (Fla. 1996).
2. Id. at 326.
3. Id.
4. Id. Specifically, the policy stated that "[a]nyone else while occupying your car if the
occupancy is (or is reasonably believed to be) with your permission... [sic] is also an insured'
under the UM provisions of the policy. Id.
5. Id. The policy's definition of an uninsured automobile included a vehicle "to which
a bodily injury liability insurance policy or bond applies at the time of the accident, but the
limits are less than the total damages for bodily injury or death resulting from the accident." Id.
(quoting the policy).
6. Id. The decedent's estate did not release any claims against petitioner for UM benefits.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The trial court held that "the estate could not recover under both the liability and
uninsured motorist provisions of the same policy." Warren v. Travelers Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d
1082, 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
9. See id. at 1083 & n.1 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 569 So. 2d 1337, 1339
(Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). The First District Court of Appeal held that" '[e]xclusions to [uninsured
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Florida HELD, that an insurer is not required by section 627.727 to
provide UM coverage to a class II"0 passenger in a single-car
accident."
Like many other states," Florida has enacted laws that require
insurance companies to provide UM coverage for their policyholders."

motorist] coverage are not enforceable if the injured person is covered by the [bodily injury
liability] provisions of the policy.' "See id. The court of appeal further distinguished the instant
case from Reid v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977) and, impliedly,
Brixius v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1991) by stating that those cases involved a
valid liability exclusion, an exclusion which was absent in the instant case. Warren, 650 So. 2d.
at 1083-84. For a discussion of Reid, see infra note 42. For a discussion of Brixius, see infra
notes 35-43 and accompanying text. The First District Court of Appeal certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida: "May an injured person who is entitled to recover
bodily injury liability benefits, but whose damages exceed the policy limit for liability coverage,
also recover under the same policy for uninsured motorist benefits, where the policy excludes
the insured vehicle from its definition of 'uninsured vehicle'?" Id. at 1084 (original in caps).
Shortly after the First District Court of Appeal decided the instant case, the Second District
Court of Appeal reached a contrary position in Bulone v. United Serv. Auto Ass'n, 660 So. 2d
399, 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
10. Warren, 678.So. 2d at 327. The instant court discussed the differences between "class
r'and "class I" insureds:
[C]lass I insureds are named insureds and resident relatives of named insureds.
Conversely, class II insureds are lawful occupants of the insured vehicle who are
not named insureds or resident relatives of named insureds. Class II insureds do not
pay for UM coverage under the named insureds' policy. Rather, class II insureds
are essentially third party beneficiaries to the named insureds' policy.
Id. at 326 n.2. Class I insureds are referred to as primary insureds in this Comment.
11. Id. at 329.
12. See Diane Mihalsky, Note, Duran v. Hartford Insurance Co.: When Is an Insured
Uninsured?,22 ARIz ST. L.J. 493, 497 & n.23 (1990).
13. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (1989). The statute provides in relevant part:
(1)No motor vehicle liability insurance policy which provides bodily injury
liability coverage shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect
to any specifically insured or identified motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless uninsured motor vehicle coverage is provided therein
or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles.... The coverage described under this section shall be over and above,
but shall not duplicate, the benefits available to an insured under ...any motor
vehicle liability insurance coverage ... and such coverage shall cover the
difference, if any, between the sum of such benefits and the damages sustained, up
to the maximum amount of such coverage provided under this section. The amount
of coverage available under this section shall not be reduced by a setoff against any
coverage, including liability insurance....
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These laws attempt to provide protection to insured motorists against a
tortfeasor's lack of insurance or lack of sufficient coverage to pay for
the insured's injuries. 4 Florida first enacted its statutory scheme of
regulated UM insurance in 1961."s However, in subsequent years both
the Florida Legislature and the courts have struggled to determine the
limits of UM coverage that insurers are required to provide. 6
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Smith, 7 inquired into this legislative scheme to decide whether an
insured could recover UM benefits where a tortfeasor's liability
insurance was less than the insured's damages." In Shelby, the plaintiff
alleged she was injured in an automobile accident as a result of the
negligence of another driver. 9 The plaintiff demanded 'payment of
$25,000 under the UM provisions of her policy because the tortfeasor's
liability
insurance could not adequately compensate her total damag20
.
es
The Shelby court began its analysis by stating that an inquiry into
legislative history was unnecessary where there was no ambiguity in the
statute.21 Thus, the court turned to the plain language of the statute.22
(3) For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall,
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an
insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer thereof:
(b) Has provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are less
than the total damages sustained by the person legally entitled to recover damages.
Id.

14. Mihalsky, supra note 12, at 502-04 (discussing uninsured motorist insurance's purpose
to allow insureds to protect themselves against those without insurance or adequate amounts of
insurance).
15. Interestingly, when first enacted, a tortfeasor had to lack insurance completely before
UM coverage was required. See Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 556 So. 2d 393, 393 (Fla. 1990)
(citing FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1961)). Thus, under the original UM statute, the respondent in
the instant case still would have been unable to recover.
16. See Warren, 678 So. 2d at 326-28 (discussing several statutory modifications to §
627.727). As of 1990, some 26 legislative enactments had modified Florida's uninsured motorist
statute. David J. Zappitell & Steven R. Braten, Abracadabra:The Disappearanceof Uninsured

Motorist Coverage, 69 FLA. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 35 n.6 (citing Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 716
(Fla. 2d DCA 1990)).
17. 556 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1990).
18. 1d; at 393.
19. Id.

20. Id.
"Shelby Mutual claimed that Smith's accident did not involve an 'uninsured motor
vehicle,' as statutorily defined." Id.
21. Id. at 395 (citing Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc.,
434 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1983)). However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Shaw stated: "It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that legislative intent is the polestar by which the
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Crucial to the court's interpretation of section 627.727 was subsection
(3)(b), which defined an UM vehicle as "one having limits of bodily
injury liability for its insured which are less than the applicable UM
limits. 2 3 The Shelby court reasoned that because the tortfeasor's
liability limit did in fact exceed the insured's UM protection limit, the
tortfeasor's vehicle was not an UM vehicle under the statute.2 4
In the same year Shelby was decided, the First District Court of
Appeal, in Travelers Insurance Companies v. Chandler,S addressed the
validity of a "your-car" exclusion under the UM provisions of the
plaintiff's insurance policy. 26 In Chandler,the plaintiff was a passenger
in the primary insured's vehicle and sustained injuries in a single-car
accident.27 The driver's insurer, defendant, paid the plaintiff $240,000,
which exhausted the policy's liability limit.2 Subsequently, plaintiff
sought to recover UM benefits because his damages exceeded the
$240,000 received. 29 The court determined that, under the statutory
definition of an uninsured vehicle, the vehicle in question would not

court must be guided, and this intent must be given effect even though it may contradict the
strict letter of the statute." Id. at 397 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d
820, 824 (Fla. 1981)). In addition, Justice Shaw stated that legislative purpose should control
where a literal statutory interpretation is clearly contrary to such purpose. Id. (Shaw, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 395-96.

23. Id. at 396.
24. Id. This conclusion created an anomalous result:
Assume the claimant had $200,001 or more in damages. If the tortfeasor had
$100,000 in coverage and the claimant had equal limits of underinsured motorist
coverage, the claimant could receive no uninsured motorist benefits.... However,
if the claimant had merely $1 more in coverage, he or she could receive up to
$100,001 in underinsured motorist benefits, in addition to the tortfeasor's liability
limits.
Bulone v. United States Auto. Ass'n, 660 So. 2d 399, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
It was unnecessary for the Shelby court to address the issue of set-off. Shelby, 556 So. 2d
at 396. "Set-off' deals with whether the liability benefits of the tortfeasor are used to reduce
(i.e., set-off) the available UM benefits to the insured, or whether the insured's damages are
reduced by the amount of liability protection the tortfeasor has. See Warren, 678 So. 2d at 327
(discussing the legislative history with regard to set-off).
25. 569 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
26. Id. at 1338.
27. Id.

28. Id. Although the policy's limit was $300,000, the plaintiff was not the only claimant
under the liability portion of the policy. Because the other claimant received $60,000, the
$240,000 received by the plaintiff exhausted the $300,000 liability policy. Id.
29. Id. Plaintiff sought $60,000 in UM benefits. Id.
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have been included." The court relied on Shelby, finding that the
vehicle was not an UM vehicle under section 627.727 because the
tortfeasor's
liability limit was not less than the insured's $300,000 UM
3
limit. '
However, the Chandler court stated that the policy itself defined a
UM vehicle in terms of the tortfeasor's liability coverage being less than
the insured's damages.32 Thus, the policy considered the driver's car an
UM vehicle. 33 Addressing a "your-car" exclusion in the policy, the
court held that section 627.727(1) required that coverage be provided
because the plaintiff was covered under the liability portion of the
policy, and therefore, the insurer could not preclude the plaintiff from
receiving UM benefits. 4
Just one year later, in Brixius v. Allstate Insurance Co.,35 the
Supreme Court of Florida once again addressed the extent of UM
benefits that an insurer is required to provide. 6 In Brixius, the plaintiff
was injured while she was riding as a passenger in her own car.37 The
car was driven by'a friend who was uninsured.38 The plaintiff made a
claim for UM benefits because she was excluded from receiving liability
benefits under her own policy. 9 However, the insurer denied UM
benefits because of a "your-car" exclusion in the plaintiff's policy.'
The Brixius court held that the exclusion was valid because section
627.727 did not require UM benefits to be paid to an insured who was
injured in a vehicle covered under the liability portion of the insured's
policy.4 ' With sparse reasoning, the Brixius court noted that the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.

35. 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam).
36. See id. at 237.
37. Id. at 236.
38. Id. at 236-37.
39. Id. at 237 ("[Ihe Allstate policy covering the vehicle excluded liability coverage for
injuries sustained by a named insuied... "').
40. Id. The plaintiff's policy provided that "an uninsured auto is not a vehicle defined as
an insured auto under the liability portion of this policy." Id.
41. Id. In dissent, Justice Kogan found the policy exclusion clearly void as contrary to the
purpose of the no-fault system of motorist insurance. Id. at 238 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting). Justice
Kogan stated:
The legislature expressly has stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage
is for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages.... An exclusion of this type, which was embodied in the
Brixius' policy, is so directly contrary to the policies of no-fault and the uninsured
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legislature had not amended the statute to require such benefits to be
paid subsequent to past decisions which had reached the same holding.42 Furthermore, the court recognized that the payment'4 3of UM
benefits would effectively nullify a "valid liability exclusion.
Once again entering the UM debate, the instant court held that UM
benefits did not have to be paid to a class II insured if the policy in
question contained a provision excluding the primary insured's vehicle
from UM coverage.' The court began its analysis by stating that the
1984 amendment to section 627.727 was an attempt to offset the
insured's damages by payments made by the tortfeasor's insurance,
rather than setting off the amount of UM benefits available to the
insured by such payments.45 However, citing Shelby, the court46noted
that the legislature had failed to completely accomplish its goal.
The instant court noted that the legislature amended section 627.727
again in 1988 to require that an insured's available UM benefits be
offset by payments made by the tortfeasor's insurer.47 However, in
1989 the legislature again modified the statute to return to offsetting an
insured's damages, and not UM benefits available, by payments received
from the tortfeasor's insurer.48 The instant court found the 1989
amendment and its underlying legislative intent important in deciding
the case.49
The court determined that there was no legislative intent to protect
class II insureds under both liability and UM coverage in situations like
the instant case.50 Rather, the 1989 amendment served only to return

motorist statute as to be void on its face. It is nothing less than allowing insurance
companies to exclude coverage for certain classes of vehicles that happen to be
driven by uninsured motorists.
Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
42. Brixius, 589 So. 2d at 237. The Brixius court found that Reid v. State Farm &
Casualty Co., 352 So. 2d. 1172 (Fla. 1977) was controlling. Brixius, 589 So. 2d at 237. The Reid
court recognized that "as a general rule, .. . an insurer may not limit the applicability of
uninsured motorist protection." Reid, 352 So. 2d at 1173. However, the Reid court held that the
"your-car" exclusion in question was not barred by § 627.727. Id. at 1174.
43. Brixius, 589 So. 2d at 238.
44. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 327.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id.

49. See id.
50. Id. "The staff analysis does not suggest that chapter 89-243 was intended to enable
class II insureds who are injured in a single-car accident to recover both liability and UM
benefits under the same policy." Id.
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to pre-1988 set-off rules."1 Thus, the court determined that section
627.727(3)(b) defines a "liability insurer" as an insurer other than the
UM insurer."
The court further noted that the legislature's response to Brixius
supported the court's holding. 3 The court stated that after Brixius, the
legislature amended section 627.727 to provide UM benefits to a
primary insured when a "nonfamily permissive user is driving" the
primary insured's vehicle.54 The instant court stated that such an
amendment would have been unnecessary if the statute already had
required UM coverage whenever an insured's vehicle was covered under
liability coverage.5
In concurrence, Justice Wells reached the same conclusion. 6 Rather
than utilize legislative history, however, Justice Wells found that the
plain language of section 627.727(3)(b) did not indicate any exception
which would allow an insurer to escape providing UM benefits in the
instant case. 7 Nevertheless, Justice Wells believed that the fact that the
insurer had no right to subrogation in a situation like the instant case
was sufficient to support the instant court's decision. 8
Two justices dissented. 9 The dissent found that the statute was
clear, unambiguous and not "patently unreasonable" in its operation.'
Thus, because the vehicle's liability insurance covered less than the cost
of injuries sustained by the Respondent's wife, the Respondent's wife
was eligible for UM benefits under the policy.6' Accordingly, unlike
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 328. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3) (1995) provides in part:

For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor vehicle" shall, subject
to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an insured
motor vehicle when the liability insurer thereof:

. .

. (c) Excludes liability coverage

to a nonfamily member whose operation of an insured vehicle results in injuries to
the named insured or to a relative of the named insured who is a member of the
named insured's household.
55. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 328.
56. Id. at 329 (Wells, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 329-30 (Wells, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 330 (Wells, J., concurring). Justice Wells found that subrogation rights play an
important purpose in the overall scheme of UM insurance and noted that they are specifically
provided for in § 627.727. Id. (Wells, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Anstead, J., joined by Kogan, cJ., dissenting) (stating "we are obligated to follow
[the § 627.727] mandate without invoking our own view as to the policy it reflects").
61. Id.
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the instant court, the dissent considered neither the particular facts and
consequences of the case nor the legislature's intent regarding section
627.727 to delimit UM coverage in the instant case.62
Determining that the instant case did not fall within the mandatory
requirements of section 627.727, the Supreme Court of Florida
confirmed its reasoning in Brixius, to the extent that the legislature had
not abrogated it, and declined to follow the First District Court of
63 While Chandler emphatically
Appeal's reasoning in Chandler.
determined that, as long as an insured was covered by the liability
portion of the policy, exclusions to UM benefits could not be enforced," the instant court certainly discarded any such general rule.6'
Instead, the instant court found that section 627.727 was not meant to
encompass the particular facts of the instant case.'
In an attempt to understand the legislative intent, the instant court
focused on the legislative history of amendments to section 627.727.67
Important to the instant court's determination was the legislative
response, or lack thereof, to decisions such as Shelby and Brixius. 6' The
court noted that the amendment to section 672.727 following the Brixius
decision would not have been necessary if the statute already prohibited
insurers from denying UM coverage to any individual covered under a
liability policy.69 Consistent with the instant court's reasoning, it can
be inferred that there was never any legislative intent to include class II
insureds, as the amendment did not require a class II insured to be
covered. 0 Thus, because Brixius stood for the proposition that UM
coverage was not automatically required when an UM vehicle was also
covered under the liability portion of the policy, and the response,
section 627.727(3)(c), covered only the primary insured, the Legislature
meant to retain Brixius for class II insureds.7 '
While the court's interpretation of legislative intent rests on solid
ground, arguably the court did not need to make such an inquiry. The
Shelby court had stated that an unambiguous statute required no inquiry

62. See id. (Anstead, L, joined by Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 329 ("We ... disapprove of Travelers Ins. Cos. v. Chandler, 569 So. 2d
1337 (Fla. Ist DCA 1990), to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision herein.").
64. Chandler,569 So. 2d at 1339.
65. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 329.
66. See id. at 326-28.

67. See id. (analyzing statutory amendments to § 627.727).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 328.
70. See id.
71. See id. (italicizing "class I insured passenger" when discussing the effect of §
627.727(3)(c)).
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into legislative intent.72 As articulated by the concurring opinion in the
instant case, section 627.727 read alone can lead to a reasonable
interpretation that UM coverage was required in the instant case.73 The
dissent adopted this conclusion, stating that the statutory language was
"clear and unambiguous."74
However, legislative intent plays a special role in insurance
regulation, and the need for clarity is exceptional. This need is, in part,
a result of the consequences that mandatory coverage has on both the
insurers and the insureds because the extent to which insurers must
provide UM benefits is crucial to the determination of premiums.75
Therefore, in order for the court to require insurers to cover class II
insureds in situations like the instant case, the Legislature needs to make
such coverage
expressly clear to enable insurers to establish appropriate
76
premiums.
While the practical impact of the instant case is clear, what is less
certain is the future effects it will have. When viewed in conjunction
with the decisions in Brixius and Shelby, a trend emerges which requires
the Legislature to use explicit statutory language before the court will
impose a requirement of coverage on insurers. 77 This is evidenced by
the instant court's statement in dicta that even a primary insured still
could be excluded from UM coverage if the policy disallowed liability
coverage for family members. 7' This trend is consistent with the
proposition
that insurers need clear guidelines in determining premi79
ums.

The split between proponents and opponents of the instant case's
reasoning is, in part, the result of differing fundamental ideas about the
purpose of section 627.727. If one believes that section 627.727 is a
comprehensive scheme of insurance regulation to ensure that no insured
with a valid claim for damages will be denied compensation, then the
instant case severely departs from section 627.727's purpose."0 On the
72. Shelby, 556 So. 2d at 395; see supra text accompanying note 21.
73. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 329 (Wells, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 330 (Anstead, J.. joined by Kogan, C.J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 329 (citing 3 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE § 35.7 (2d ed. 1995)).
76. See id. (citing WIDISS, supra note 75, § 35.7).
77. See Shelby, 556 So. 2d at 393-96; Brixius, 589 So. 2d at 236-38.
78. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 328 n.4. The court reached this conclusion by interpreting §
627.727(3)(c) as limited to situations where nonfamily individuals were permitted to drive. Id.
79. See WIDISS, supra note 74, § 35.7 and accompanying text.
80. See Zappitell & Braten, supra note 16, at 35. Zappitell and Braten believe that the
Florida Supreme Court's recent trend has been unwarranted and "[w]ithout the sanction of the
Florida Legislature.. . ." Id. at 37. They go on to say that "the Supreme Court [sic] has limited
the availability of UM coverage in situations in which one might have expected it to protect
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other hand, if one sees section 627.727 as something less than a
complete guarantee of recovery to insureds, the holding of the instant
case becomes more reasonable."1 The instant court attempted to
discredit the former view by noting that it would have been unnecessary
for the Legislature to enact section 627.727(3)(c) if section 627.727
already required UM coverage whenever there was liability coverage. 2
The instant court's decision, at the least, settled the confusion
surrounding the extent of UM coverage to class II insureds in single car
accidents, something the Legislature was unable to do. The result of the
instant case for insurance litigation is that class H insureds will be
unable to collect UM benefits where the primary insured's policy
contains a "your-car" exclusion to UM benefits. 3 While arguably the
decision can be seen as a judicial determination to limit the rights of the
insured, such a conclusion is unwarranted. The court has invited the
Legislature to clearly express its intent, rather than require the court to
guess as to the extent of coverage that section 627.727 embodies or to
reach a decision that produces anomalous results and runs contrary to
notions of common sense. Whether or not this invitation is accepted is
a matter left to the public and the Legislature.

accident victims." Id. Consistent with these conclusions, the authors' starting premise is that §
627.727 is based on broad public policy goals. Id. at 35. The court of appeal in the instant case
relied on this broader concept of uninsured motorist insurance, stating "[e]xclusions to
[uninsured motorist] coverage are not enforceable if the injured person is covered by the [bodily
injury liability] provisions of the policy." Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083 (quoting Chandler, 569
So. 2d at 1339).
81. This view of the statute as less than all-encompassing is supported by recognition of
many of the consequences of a very comprehensive statute. For instance, one such result is that
uninsured motorist benefits begin to operate as additional liability insurance. WIDISS, supra note
75, § 35.7. This point was expressly made by the instant court. Warren, 678 So. 2d at 328.
82. Id. ("If the legislature meant section 627.727(3)(b) to mean what the court below now
says it means, then there would have been no reason whatsoever to enact section
627.727(3)(c)."); see supra note 53 (setting out § 627.727(3)(c)). This analysis is, at least
implicitly, an attack on the Chandler court's reasoning and basic premises, as the court of
appeal's decision in the instant case relied heavily on Chandler.See Warren, 650 So. 2d at 1083
("[WMe believe the Chandler decision controls here.").
83. See Warren, 678 So. 2d at 326-28.
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